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Institutions and Economic Development:
Some Thoughts on the Transition
Vasant A. Sukhatme

A

lmost exactly ten years ago today, on February 2, 1990, South
African President F.W. de Klerk lifted the ban on the African National
Congress, the South African Communist Party, and other political
organizations. About one week later, Nelson Mandela was released
after more that a quarter century in prison; within four years the first
open, relatively free elections were held and Mandela was elected
president. A color-blind constitution was adopted in 1996. The second
elections were held on schedule in the spring of 1999, and Vice President Thabo Mbeki succeeded Mandela as president. By any measure,
the past ten years have been one of momentous change.
A riveting drama is unfolding in South Africa and it was exciting to
be there, if only for a brief period, as a participant in the Macalester
Faculty International Development Seminar during January 2000. I
learned much from my experience and will draw on what I saw and
read to enrich what I teach, particularly in my course on international
economic development. In what follows, I do not presume to do an
“Inside South Africa” piece; this is a complex society and economy and
a short visit of three weeks is obviously insufficient for purposes of
understanding the country.
South Africa offers a very interesting case study of a particular
development strategy which fueled economic growth for a long
period, but eventually confronted the rigidities of a legal and political
system that could not have the flexibility to sustain that economic
growth. The subject matter of development economics is incentives,
institutions, and innovation. The story of South Africa is ultimately
how a political ideology created a system of preferences and privileges
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and thereby an institutional framework that resulted in a failure of
markets. This failure could not sustain economic growth.
This essay proceeds as follows: I begin with an overview of the
economy of South Africa in the context of the institutional arrangements that were set in place. I then analyze how this institutional setting set the stage for its own downfall by creating rigidities that were
unable to overcome the slowing of economic growth. Finally, I speculate on the economic prognosis for South Africa. In a postscript, I comment on confronting an Indian identity in South Africa.
*****
South Africa has a population of about 40 million people, of whom 3%
are Indian, 8% “coloured” (the South African term for people of mixed
race), 14% white, and 75% black. Only three other countries in subSaharan Africa (Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo) have larger populations. In physical area, South Africa is the
size of France, Germany, and Italy put together. In purchasing power
parity terms, South Africa has an average per capita income of about
$7,500, which places it in the World Bank’s category of upper middleincome countries, along with countries such as Malaysia and Mexico.
The average income figure masks significant income and wealth
inequalities. In sub-Saharan Africa, only Botswana and Mauritius have
higher average incomes.
The United Nations noted in its 1994 Human Development Report that
“If white South Africa were a separate country, it would rank 24th in
the world (just after Spain). Black South Africa would rank 123rd in the
world (just above Congo). Not just two different peoples, these are
almost two different worlds.”1 About one-half of the total income in
South Africa accrues to the top 10% of income recipients. This is a far
larger figure than for the U.S., but somewhat lower than for Brazil.
The discovery of diamonds in the Kimberley area in 1867 and the
discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886 marked the beginning
of a growth period that lasted nearly a century. The rise of mining
facilitated the growth of a domestic explosives industry, which grew to
encompass the manufacture of industrial chemicals and fertilizer for
agriculture. By the early 1930s, the manufacturing sector exceeded
agriculture in its contribution to the nation’s gross domestic product
and, by 1948, it exceeded both agriculture and mining. Until the early
1930s, the growth of population kept pace with the growth of national
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income; as a result, per capita income grew hardly at all. Between the
early 1930s and 1970, however, per capita income in constant prices
grew by about 3.5% per year.2
The National Party came to power in 1948 on the platform of
apartheid. The apartheid era was characterized by a steady growth of
government intervention and ownership of the economy. From coal to
electricity and from steel to petrochemicals, there was government
direction and ownership. Much of that legacy remains today. For
example, the life insurance industry is still required to invest a prescribed portion of its assets in government stock. The government’s
hand was also heavy in agriculture. The land rights of black Africans
were very stringently restricted while an extraordinary set of privileges and favorable policies benefited white large-scale agriculture. As
a consequence, a very dualistic agricultural sector emerged. This outcome is not unique to South Africa; many countries in the rest of Africa
and in Latin America share these features.3
Between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s,
South Africa grew quite rapidly — at an average GDP growth rate of
well over 5% per year; from 1974 to 1984, the growth rate was under
2% per year, and lower still in the 1984–94 period. South Africa experienced a growth failure. In that sense, South Africa was not much different from many other countries in the developing world which had
experienced rapid growth in the early years of their independence followed by prolonged anemic growth. In the South African case, the
growth rate was remarkably stable in the period between the end of
the Second World War and the early 1970s; since then, however, there
have been sharp swings in the growth rate. Since 1994, the growth rate
has averaged about 2.5% per year, but it appears to be picking up. The
oil price shocks of the early 1970s, the growing international isolation
of the economy arising from South Africa’s apartheid policies, and the
rigidities of that policy itself all played a role in the slowing down of
the economy.
*****
There is little doubt that the quality of governance affects long-term
economic growth. The effect on growth can be beneficial or detrimental. On the beneficial side, good governance by building up the human
agent fosters economic growth. Bad governance inevitably leads to
policy distortions and factor market rigidities, which dampen long-
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term growth prospects. Bad governance also affects the capacity of the
government to handle external shocks as they occur.
There is growing consensus among economists that institutions are
a key factor in determining a nation’s economic performance. The
economist Nobel laureate Douglass North defined institutions as the
humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.4 The
institutional framework of a nation or society consists of its formal and
informal rules or modes of behavior and norms, its laws, and its
enforcement systems. North contends that economic performance is
shaped by ideology and institutions. Economic activity involves
exchange that, in turn, involves negotiation and enforcement. The
attendant costs are called transaction costs. Institutions affect transaction costs, which affect production and exchange. Clearly defined
property rights lower transaction costs and widen markets; more can
be produced and consumed in an economy that safeguards persons
and property from the abusive power of government or coercive entities. By separating and prohibiting many kinds of transactions across
racial groups, the system of apartheid meant that many mutually beneficial transactions were not effected. In other words, the system of
apartheid raised the cost of doing business.
Apartheid was a state-initiated system of racial discrimination,
which segregated people by race, restricted access to schooling for the
majority population, and prevented labor mobility. The main pillars of
apartheid were the Group Areas Acts, the Population Registration
Acts, and the Land Acts. The Group Areas Act and subsequent amendments established distinct urban areas for whites, Asians, and
coloureds, and controlled the inflow of the black population to urban
areas. The Population Registration Act required that each person’s race
be defined. The 1913 Land Act effectively partitioned the country into
white and black areas, with blacks (then about two-thirds of the population) allocated about 7% of the land, and whites (then about 21% of
the population) allocated 93% of the land. The Act made it illegal for
blacks to own or rent farms in the white areas.
Forced removals of coloured and Asian populations from white
urban areas was also part of the grand design to separate the races. The
system of apartheid reserved skilled and semi-skilled jobs for the
white population and created an educational system that was incapable of producing nonwhite skilled labor. State spending was allocated differentially on the basis of color. This acted as a severe resource
constraint on the continued growth of the economy. The system of
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racial preferences raised labor costs and the response to growing labor
costs was an increasing capital intensity of production.
By the end of the 1970s, apartheid had begun to take a toll on the
South African economy, and numerous economic and political
changes were beginning to occur to remedy the situation.5 It is important to note, however, that while the removal of the ban on the ANC
was a dramatic event, numerous attempts at political reform had
already begun in the late 1970s. The early 1980s had seen the abolition
of many of the most obnoxious manifestations of apartheid, followed
by attempts at political reform in the form of a new, tri-cameral parliament with houses for whites, coloureds, and Indians, but not for
blacks.6 These attempts were piecemeal and ad hoc, and ultimately did
not amount to much.
Of course, occupational segregation is not unique to South Africa.
For example, the caste system in India resulted for many years in certain kinds of occupational segregation. In South Africa, the black population was restricted to mining, agricultural labor, and low-skilled
jobs in the urban areas. The structure of incentives in such a system
restricts the social and occupational mobility of a large fraction of the
population. The structure of incentives led to an inefficient use of labor
and a very unequal distribution of income. It is, of course, important to
bear in mind that the structure of incentives refers not only to the set of
relative prices that prevails in an economy but also the degree of access
to markets, barriers to entry, and discrimination.7
South Africa was not a predictable candidate for pursuing an
import-substituting industrialization strategy; it did not have the
domestic market size to make a real go of it. Large countries are more
likely to pursue an import-substituting industrialization path. Brazil
and India are the quintessential case studies. Numerous country case
studies have shown the ill effects of import-substituting industrialization strategies. One of the major unintended effects has been the
growth of a capital-intensive, high-cost industrial structure that is not
able to compete in world markets. The resulting industrial structure is
also not able to generate much employment. Further, the system of
apartheid and the strategy of import-substituting industrialization
gave rise to a class of activities that the trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati called directly-unproductive, profit-seeking activities.8 Such kinds
of activities, also called rent-seeking, waste scarce resources and do not
contribute to increased output or efficiency even where they produce
pecuniary returns.
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As noted, between the end of the Second World War and the early
1970s, South Africa’s GDP grew by about 5% per year. If this growth
rate had persisted between the early 1970s and the end of apartheid in
1994, per capita income in 1994 would have been nearly 2.5 times
larger than it actually was. Perhaps a significant part of this “lost”
income is due to the policies of apartheid and import-substituting
industrialization.
To be sure, South Africa experienced quite handsome growth in the
early years — but this did not last long and was followed by a protracted period of slow growth and stagnation. In that sense, again, the
experience of South Africa was not hugely different from many other
African countries.
*****
It is straightforward to identify the central problem of South Africa’s
transition to a stable, multiracial, and growing economy: the economy
needs to be set on a path of steady growth at a rate that will make a
dent in the problem of unemployment, while ensuring that the previously dispossessed majority secure access to educational and other
resources. The economy still depends on the export of gold, diamonds,
and other mineral products with the associated repercussions arising
from fluctuations in the world prices of these products. It is also clear
that South Africa’s economy needs to be thoroughly restructured if it is
to become internationally competitive. There is no evidence that there
will be any large-scale transfer of physical assets or capital from the
minority white to the majority black population. As a result, the gap in
income and wealth between the races is going to be slow in closing.
Al Harberger has noted that “the easiest starting point for a successful growth experience is a once-prosperous economy that has suffered
from bad policies. Releasing that economy from its trammels and correcting an accumulation of past mistakes can sometimes set in motion
a prolonged episode of astounding growth.”9 South Korea, China, and
Malaysia appear to be examples of what Harberger has in mind. In the
face of the daunting problems of growth and employment creation,
South Africa has moved quite quickly to get on the path of steady,
non-inflationary growth. The government has launched an ambitious
reconstruction and development program to improve housing conditions for the black majority, create employment, and provide greater
access to medical care and education. The government is financing the
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program in a fiscally conservative manner and encouraging both foreign and domestic investment. On the basis of my observations, I conclude that as South Africa sets out to correct the inequities of the past
by enabling the majority to acquire education and training, a rapid
growth phase is certainly not to be ruled out.
It is not particularly surprising that the South African economy
reached a period of stagnation under a set of restrictive policies; it is
perhaps more surprising that the economy grew as long as it did under
that restrictive regime. Studies by economists on the growth performance of numerous countries has taught the development economics
profession that, sooner or later, policies come home to roost. If an economy chooses a certain set of policies with its attendant distortions in
relative prices or incentives or rewards, the economy will earn its “just
reward” for that set of policies. The engines of economic growth in the
apartheid era were mineral extraction and manufacturing primarily
for the domestic market, behind high tariff walls. These engines stalled
in the face of rigidities created by the policies followed.
The Cape Town newspapers of the last few days of our stay in
South Africa were full of all manner of good news on the economic
front: South Africa was experiencing a steady inflow of foreign equity
capital; the Johannesburg stock market was on a steady upward trend;
the inflation rate was trending steadily downward; and the dollar
value of the South African Rand was holding steady. This combination
of news leads me to conclude that the global capital markets view the
country’s prospects favorably. I have no basis on which to disagree.
To be sure, I did not meet people from all walks of life or many professions. Yet, I came away from South Africa feeling quite optimistic
about its ability to face the problems of transition and build a stable
and prosperous country in the southern part of Africa. A fascinating
drama is unfolding in South Africa. I will watch it with great interest.
*****
Finally, some thoughts on being an “Indian” in South Africa. As an
Indian immigrant to the U.S., it was interesting to compare my experience with that of the South African Indians. Between 1860 and 1910,
many thousands of Indians came to South Africa as indentured laborers to work the sugar plantations in Natal; these were followed by
migrants who came in search of employment and business opportunities. In contrast, Indian emigration to the U.S. was not significant until

321

Macalester International

Vol. 9

the late 1960s and early 1970s. The first wave consisted largely of academics pursuing undergraduate or graduate work. Businesspeople and
“high-tech” computer professionals have become a more significant
part of this inflow only recently.
South African Indians, now many third, fourth, and even fifth generation, and comprising just over one million in a nation of 40 million,
seem well assimilated into the fabric of their country. The combined
culture is stable and represents the full spectrum of backgrounds,
resulting in a broadly inclusive amalgamation of Indian and South
African traditions. I observed that most Indians do not speak the old
language but maintain many of the old customs and rituals; a strong
ethnic identity still persists. The Indian population includes many
prominent people in the academic world, in government, and in the
corporate world: there are many tenured Indian faculty at leading universities; there are Indians in President Mbeki’s cabinet; there are Indians on the board of the South African central bank. In the U.S., similar
ascendance is more recent, and we are still in cultural transition. Thus,
my visit, especially to the densely Indian-populated city of Durban,
felt a bit like a look forward to the future of Indians in the United
States.
While growing up in India, I had, of course, read about India’s
struggle for independence from British colonial rule. The great Indian
leader Mahatma Gandhi first went to South Africa in 1893 as an attorney representing an Indian businessperson in Natal in a business lawsuit (and ended up spending nearly twenty years in South Africa). By
that year, many Indians had completed their indentures and moved
from the sugar plantations and coal mines to urban areas. They competed successfully with the white settlers in establishing small trading
and commercial firms and this had aroused considerable anti-Indian
sentiment. The small white settler population was intent on enacting a
number of laws discriminatory toward Indians and blacks. It was in
that background of growing anti-Indian sentiment that Gandhi arrived
in South Africa. He quickly became involved in the public life of the
Indian community and served as the first secretary of the Natal Indian
Congress, which was established in 1894. It is said that it was in South
Africa that he fine-tuned his techniques of nonviolence and mass
action.
Gandhi’s most important legacy to South Africa is the philosophy of
nonviolence. The legacy is taken seriously. Nelson Mandela and others
in the senior group of the ANC have continued to talk of multiracial
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reasonableness. But so did many others we met, including the (nonwhite) parents of a current Macalester student from South Africa and
several members of a coloured family in Cape Town who have been
host family for students from Macalester and other U.S. colleges. In
our conversations, I was struck by the wish expressed by these people
to look to the future and not dwell on the historical inequities of the
apartheid era. The outlook for South Africa is good. 嘷
䢇
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